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Abstract 
During the 1950’s a true construction frenzy was dominating the Belgian colony. Jean Stiégnon, a 
prominent architect on the colonial scene, described the Congolese cities as “true beehives where both 
white and black construction workers were bustling about” and where “the dull sounds of bulldozers 
and concrete mixers were reverberating through the air”. In particular in the capital city, this 
construction frenzy had led to heavy speculation on the little available inner-city plots, and instead of 
the single-storey buildings of the immediate post-war years, multi-storey buildings started to redraw the 
city’s skyline. 
It is in this context of big real-estate investments that the Belgian contractor Blaton-Aubert is 
expanding its business into Congo with the subsidiary Compagnie Congolaise de Constructions (CCC). 
To firmly position themselves on the newly emerging market, they want to showcase their abilities by 
constructing their own office building; the first structure using prestressed concrete in sub-Saharan 
Africa. The CCC publicly states that they do not use the technique to “sacrifice [themselves] to a 
fashionable trend, but rather to intelligently meet the particular economic factors of Africa”. A close 
reading of the building site however, learns that most of these ‘African factors’ are based on an imagined 
Congolese ‘particularity’ prevailing in Belgium at the time. Many of the ‘advantages’ forwarded by the 
CCC, turn out to be liabilities, more than on anything else based on a racist perspective on African 
labour. 
Keywords: Prestressed concrete, Belgian Congo, Léopoldville (Kinshasa), building site accidents, 
African labour. 
 
The first realizations of the Compagnie Congolaise de Constructions are executed in prestressed 
concrete, using the Blaton technique. Not at all to sacrifice ourselves to a fashionable trend, but rather 
to intelligently meet the particular economic factors of Africa, by applying a relatively new technique, 
that we nevertheless master completely through our experience. 
(Compagnie Congolaise de Constructions 1969) 
1. Introduction 
While in the early 1940’s Léopoldville, today’s Kinshasa, was still a quiet garden town, after the second 
World War the city started to live up to the meaning of the colonial dream; the city was becoming the 
true capital of the Colonie Modèle that the Belgians wanted to showcase to the world. A government-
launched ten-year investment plan to turn Congo into a modern welfare state, quickly caught the eye of 
private investors who started to look to the capital as a modern-day El Dorado; quick money was 
considered a certainty and on top of that, when the cold war would heathen up, their money would be 
safe on the African continent. (Buelens 2007, Vanthemsche 2007) Everybody wanted to set up shop in 
the colonial capital and everywhere in the rightfully nicknamed ‘Mushroom Capital’ multi-storey 
buildings started shooting up. (Unknown 1953) 
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 The Belgian real-estate and construction industry obviously kept close track of these developments 
and one of the contractors quick to realize the financial opportunities in the colony was the family 
enterprise Blaton-Aubert. (Pesztat, Culot et al. 2017) When they sent Versluys, the future manager of 
the Congolese branch, to Congo in 1949 to analyse the investment possibilities, he concluded that the 
building market was far from saturated. On the contrary, he observed a total lack of professionalism in 
all the colonial capital’s contracting companies: “All [construction] firms are encumbered with work, 
they operate in poor conditions and work with inferior material, they all run behind schedule and they 
have only a very limited white staff” [note: All quotations printed in italics are translated by the author 
from French] (Versluys 1949). Versluys was clear; Blaton-Aubert could be the wind of change in the 
colonial construction industry. In contrast with all these small and unprofessional contracting 
companies, the Congolese Blaton-Aubert branch, the Compagnie Congolaise de Constructions (CCC), 
would be a rational endeavour, in tune with the image of modernity that started to pervade the capital. 
Since the company would need a pied-à-terre in the city, Versluys added that their first construction site 
on Congolese soil could be their own office building. This decision was not only a practical one 
however; the construction site of the multi-storey office building, prominently visible on a prime 
location on one of Léopoldville’s most important axes, could be a billboard for the firm’s entry into the 
Congolese market. In particular, the spectacular technique of prestressed concrete – a building technique 
which Blaton-Aubert had helped develop and fine-tune together with the world’s leading expert of the 
time, professor Gustave Magnel of Ghent University (Van de Voorde 2011, Espion and Hellebois 2017) 
– had to convince future investors of the firm’s perfect skill with state-of-the-art building technologies. 
On display: modern machinery, prefabricated concrete pieces, high-tensile steel wires and – according 
to Versluys most importantly – barely any black labourers: “Because of our modern material and the 3 
whites permanently present, the number of black labourers should be strongly reduced and chosen 
carefully… Little people should be seen on the building site… That should be one of the characteristics 
of our construction sites […] : Modern Materials, New Techniques, Quality Work and Few black labour 
(they have an awful reputation).” (Versluys April 17, 1950) 
2. Building in a fashionable trend 
As the epigraph of this paper suggests, it was not (only) its ‘fashionable’ image that made the CCC 
decide to execute their first project on Congolese soil using prestressed concrete. On the contrary, for 
three reasons, they genuinely considered prestressed concrete to be the colonial building technique par 
excellence. First, they had a biased perspective on Congolese labour. Informed by the racist idea that 
Africans were bad workers, which pervaded Belgian colonialism until the Congolese independence in 
1960, the CCC wanted to deskill the construction site through the use of prestressed concrete. Second, 
they (publicly) thought of prestressed concrete as the most economic building technique for the 
‘particular economic factors of Africa’. Although these ‘economic factors’ largely fall back on the 
biased labour perspective, as we will see, they also forwarded some other economic advantages. Finally, 
prestressed concrete, so they argued, would solve some of the technical issues reinforced concrete was 
struggling with. 
Most of these theoretical ‘advantages’ however, lose all of their importance when considering the 
realities of a colonial construction site. Through a close-reading of the construction of the CCC-building 
– the first application of prestressed concrete in a building in sub-Saharan Africa – it becomes clear that 
the technique is rather a financial burden and a technical liability. Besides, the archival evidence of 
skilled labour present on the building site, also debunked the racist argument about the bad quality of 
African labourers. Such a close-reading of the building site was only possible because of the rich 
archival material documenting the construction process. The physical distance between the company’s 
headquarters in Belgium and the building site in Congo forced the different actors to communicate 
everything through handwritten letters. While for building sites in Belgium, Blaton-Aubert would 
probably hesitate to leave written evidence of the fact that to land the building permit they “had to make 
personal arrangements with Mr. Wigny [Belgian minister of colonies], who will back our case” 
(Versluys March 20, 1950), because of the distance between colony and metropole such traces can be 
found in the archive (albeit in code language at times). 
1213
 2.1. “Few black labour (they have an awful reputation)” 
After the second World War, the old continent was in ashes. The enduring atrocities had had an 
enormous impact on, what used to be, Europe’s built environment. Whole city blocks were eradicated 
from the face of the earth and many citizens, who had been risking their lives on the battlefield or 
spending their many hours in factories producing war necessities, found themselves homeless after the 
war. Reconstructing the world from its debris, became the task of the decade. While initially the 
construction industry was still largely depending on the production models of the 19th century, quickly 
the efficiency of labour and the scientific organization of the building site became the buzzwords of 
reconstruction (Wall 2013). Concrete construction in particular, played a significant role in this debate 
(Delemontey 2015). First, because the relatively new building material was not burdened by artisanal 
building trades. While for other building professions tradition often stood in the way of innovation, 
concrete was so new that its operation could still be moulded into the requirement of a scientific building 
site. Second, concrete was considered an extremely simple material on the building site. As Adrian Forty 
argued in his seminal work Concrete and Culture, it was the only material that allowed “to detach the 
skilled, mental work of building from the purely manual element”. (Forty 2012) While other building 
professions required a certain amount of skill, concrete work was generally considered to be so simple 
it could be done by day labourers. Besides, concrete easily allowed for prefabrication, which even 
eliminated the need for skilled carpenters on site. Following this line of reasoning, prestressed concrete 
perfected this detachment of manual from mental work. With the technique, even lengthy constructional 
elements – which were too expensive and too difficult to transport to the building site in one piece – 
could be prefabricated and assembled on site.  
As I have argued elsewhere, the CCC therefore considered prefabricated and prestressed concrete 
the perfect building technique in the segregated Congolese building industry; all difficult tasks could be 
executed by the engineering office in Brussels, while the actual constructional tasks were reduced to the 
simple assembly of pieces, something –they reasoned– even African labourers could manage. (Fivez 
2018) Already during the First International Conference on Prestressed Concrete in 1951, exactly this 
‘advantage’ was stressed in a paper on the use of prestressed concrete in ‘Black Africa’ by the French 
engineer Hubert: “The efficiency of African labour is particularly low when their tasks require thinking. 
On the contrary, when they are familiarized with a task that always stays the same, to the extent it 
becomes an automatic reflex – something easily achieved in a factory that produces standardized 
building elements but difficult to achieve on a building site – their efficiency starts to become normal.” 
(Hubert 1951) 
Although these ideas clearly pervaded the reasoning of the Brussels’ headquarters, in the 
correspondence of the European overseers on the building site a more nuanced stance towards African 
labour can be discerned. At several times, the Africans win the (paternalizing) admiration of their 
European overseers, talking about how easily they can train them in the (albeit simple) tasks at hand. 
Following the instructions of Versluys about using ‘few black labour’, the building site manager, Pierre 
Schaukens, even asserts that he “sure will reach a good result with [...] no more than 35 men, whom I 
will be training” (Schaukens April 22, 1950). Although Schaukens is later accused of maltreating ‘his 
men’, he repeatedly argues with the management for better payment and safer working conditions for 
his crew. In the aftermath of a severe building site accident – a crane falling to the ground from the third 
floor, severely injuring several African labourers – this sympathy of the Europeans working directly 
with the African building site personnel, clashes the swift settlement of the accident by the company’s 
Brussels management. While Versluys was mainly relieved that the material toll wasn’t higher – “It 
could have been much worse, unfortunately some of your blacks pay a high toll” (Versluys September 
12, 1950)– both Schaukens and De Wispeleir, another European overseer, are genuinely concerned with 
their men’s wellbeing. Not only do they repeatedly visit them in the hospital during their recovery, they 
also take care of the immediate financial needs of their families, and they revive their plea for better 
working conditions. This ambivalence towards local workers, at times downplaying their capabilities 
while sometimes acknowledging their potential, illustrates how the CCC carefully navigates the colonial 
context of the 1950s, slowly moving away from petty apartheid. Archival evidence shows that the CCC, 
once firmly embedded in the colonial building market, even starts to develop a social policy for workers, 
including insurance and paid leave (Lagae and Van Craenenbroeck 2015). 
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 2.2. ‘The economic factors of Africa’ 
While the modern image of prestressed concrete sure was of crucial importance to the CCC, for most 
clients, this was more of a gimmick. Economic arguments were fundamental to convince possible future 
investors of the new technique. The CCC’s economic line of reasoning falls back on the prevailing 
colonial point of view that concrete was the only building material that was both modern and locally 
available. With cement being produced in the colony from the 1920’s onwards, all of concrete’s raw 
materials were available close to any colonial building site. Concrete’s only weakness in that sense, was 
the reinforcement steel it required. The bulky steel bars were not produced in the colony, and their 
expensive import was considered an important additional building cost. The technique of prestressed 
concrete, precisely eliminating the need for this reinforcement, was therefore a godsend for the CCC. 
While the company would still have to import prestressing wires, these were much less bulky and would 
even allow aerial transport to distant building sites ‘dans la brousse’. Moreover, calling to mind the 
aforementioned perspective on African labour, the welding and bending of reinforcement steel required 
serious skill, something that was deemed to be avoided. 
If we examine the construction site of the CCC-building however, it quickly becomes clear that the 
use of prestressed concrete was more of a financial nightmare than an economic way of constructing in 
Africa. Especially in Léopoldville, the CCC already knew that they could “find steel reinforcement bars 
quite easily in the warehouses of the city.” (Versluys 1949) Besides, the fact that reinforcement steel 
was imported on a big scale, shrank the additional transport costs of the commodity to insignificance 
when compared to a total construction budget. By contrast, the high-tensile steel wires were a ‘specialty 
product’ that had to be imported only for the CCC-building. Not only was this an expensive matter, it 
often delayed the building site considerably. Besides, none of the specific machinery needed for the 
prestressing process could be found in the capital either. While Richir at several instances expressed his 
luck about the fact that the hydraulic jack never broke down – “in Brussels you may have everything 
you need, but here we do not have your tools to repair any machinery” (Richir May 11, 1950) – other 
tools did. When a wire cutter went blunt for example, replacement blades had to be imported, causing a 
serious delay. Moreover, the fact that the CCC had to outsource the prefabrication of the concrete parts, 
an additional link in the financial chain, made the prefabricated concrete more expensive than in-situ 
cast concrete. Definitely, as we will see later on, since the local producer of the concrete elements was 
reluctant to adapt his workflow to meet the high compressive strength requirements for the 
posttensioning process and a lot of the produced elements turned out to be inadmissible. 
In the end, the building’s price tag was much higher than that of a similar building in reinforced 
concrete. Oddly enough, we can read in an internal note between Verlsuys and Richir that the Blatons 
were not at all surprised about this. By contrast, they were well aware that “the application of prestressed 
concrete in Congo would certainly be very expensive” (Versluys March 11, 1950). Yet, the importance 
of the building for Blaton-Aubert was not in the economy of the building, but in convincing clients that 
prestressed concrete was an economic way of building in ‘the tropics’. Stressing that Richir had to 
indicate the company name very clearly on the building site once things started to run smoothly and 
urging him to hand out booklets about the technique of prestressed concrete, they were explicit about 
this agenda. The importance of the building was not in its economy, but in its visibility as a life-size 
billboard for a technique they wanted to export globally. As we will see in the subsequent part, rather 
than functioning as a billboard, the many technical problems on the construction site required skilful 
risk management to save the company’s reputation. 
2.3. ‘A new technique, mastered through experience’ 
Building in the tropical climate of Congo had been worrying Belgian engineers since the early 20th 
century. Relegating all existing construction technologies to an ancient and primitive history, they had 
to come up with a new way of building. Besides some modest reports of the public works department 
however, building research was never really a state matter. Therefore, the discussion on building in the 
colony was largely carried on by the private Association pour le Perfectionnement du Matériel Colonial. 
The contemplations of these engineers on how to deal with the divergent problems such as the extreme 
humidity, the (in medical science already debunked) ‘miasmas’ evaporating from the earth at night, the 
burning hot sun or the aggressive termites, led them to diverse theoretical solutions, that were never 
tested in practice. All the while, building in the colony in these early years remained largely dependent 
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 on the existing ‘prehistoric’ techniques they were all so eager to get rid of. During the late 1920’s 
however, (reinforced) concrete – more and more in use in Belgium – presented itself as the deus-ex-
machina to resolve the impasse. In his pamphlet Vers une Architecture Rationelle Congolaise – alluding 
to Le Corbusier’s Vers une Architecture – the Belgian modernist architect Désiré François propagated 
concrete as the ideal material that could resist all these harsh conditions, concluding that “the use of 
reinforced concrete should be generalized more than other local materials; these are all more or less 
perishable and need constant and costly upkeep.” Besides, the fact that even the ‘little skilled’ African 
labourers “all wanted to work with the ‘potopote with steel’ again” only added to his enthusiasm (1934). 
During the 1950’s however, this enthusiasm for concrete was brusquely disturbed. In her manuscript 
for the book Léopoldville, Son Histoire – a microhistory of the city published under the pseudonym 
Whyms (1956) – the Belgian journalist Hélène Guillaume described a horrifying event taking place on 
the 27th of August 1951; the Farinha-building collapsed during its construction. While after ten hours, 
five Congolese labourers could still be saved from a horrifying death because of a pile of bags of cement 
formed a sort of cavity in which they could survive, eleven tragically died in the accident. According to 
the forensic experts, the collapse was caused by the use of bad quality building materials. In the 
photographs of Guillaume, the building’s concrete debris took a central stage. For days, the rubble, that 
rumbled into one of Léopoldville’s most prestigious lanes, testified to concrete’s failure. (Fig. 1) 
 
 
Figure 1. Collapse of the Farinha building: a) Rescue operations, b) concrete debris. © Liberaal Archief, Ghent 
In a subsequent report on the quality of concrete in Léopoldville, the public works department even 
made note of the final strength of concrete in several buildings being more than 50 percent less than the 
quality of the corresponding test cubes. While before the accident, concrete still was of an 
unapproachable solidity, the confidence in the material slowly started to crumble away from the 
beginning of the 1950’s. With more and more international scientific research on concrete construction 
(Van de Voorde and Devos 2012) and on construction in the tropics available (Chang 2016), it became 
clear that concrete had its own ‘tropical diseases’. The lower compressive strengths (Shalon and Raphael 
1960) and the stronger corrosion of reinforcement steel in a humid climate (Lewis 1960), were the two 
issues that received most attention from engineers who were confronted with the rapidly deteriorating 
concrete structures of tropical modernism. 
Forwarding an advanced concrete construction technique in such a climate required serious nerve. 
Yet, in the reasoning of the CCC, prestressed concrete presented the ideal solution to both these 
problems. First, the concrete could be prefabricated in factory conditions. The biased stance towards 
African labour, combined with observations about the deteriorating effects of some building site 
conditions on the compressive strength of concrete (in particular the amount of water needed to keep 
concrete processable in the African heath), resulted in the idea that prefabrication would largely solve 
this issue. A closer (European) control on the simple (African) tasks, combined with the ideal conditions 
of the factory, would inevitably lead to stronger concrete. Second, the strong corrosion of the 
reinforcement steel in the humid climate was primarily attributed to the small cracks in the tensile zone 
of concrete. Prestressed concrete not only eliminated tension from concrete, most prestressed elements 
were not even reinforced and the posttensioning steel wires could easily be adequately covered in 
concrete. While theoretically, these remedies are sure valid, they did require perfect skill with the new 
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 technique. Although the CCC was glowing with self-confidence, their lack of skill quickly becomes 
apparent during two serious building site accidents, which reveal how prestressed concrete was rather a 
structural liability than a godsend.  
2.3.1. The calculation errors 
The CCC was so self-confident about ‘mastering the new technique through experience’ that they opted 
to use a technique that would –according to them – be a world first. Instead of posttensioning the beams 
on the ground of the construction site and subsequently lifting them into place, they wanted to 
posttension the prefabricated concrete parts in between the columns that were cast in-situ on the building 
site. Therefore, instead of prefabricating the end blocks, they casted them in-situ, as a whole with the 
supporting columns. The I-shaped concrete blocks were placed on scaffolding in-between these T-




Figure 2. Construction site of the CCC-building: a) Casting of the end blocks together with the columns,      
b) Positioning the prefabricated I-shaped elements. © Fondation Civa, Brussels 
However, on the 26th of May 1950, after posttensioning the fourth beam, one of the building site 
overseers, De Wispeleire, noticed some cracks in the end pieces. Only a couple of minutes later, one of 
the end blocks completely cracked open. After inspection, it became clear that the other columns had 
similar deficiencies, with cracks even baring the reinforcement steel of the columns, something 
prestressed concrete had to resolve in the first place. Richir immediately halted construction and sent a 
telegram to the Brussels headquarters. While initially Versluys reacted furious about the bad quality of 
the work, a few days later a new letter reached Léopoldville: after reassessing the reinforcement 
schemes, the Brussels headquarters had to conclude that severe miscalculations were at the base of the 
accident. All 18 columns that were already constructed had to be demolished. Afraid for gossip 
spreading like wildfire in Léopoldville, Versluys urged Richir to tell everybody that the demolishment 
was the result of an error with the heights on the plan coming from Brussels, and to “demolish with 
utmost discretion” (May 30, 1950). Blaton-Aubert simply couldn’t afford to have their skill questioned 
and the name of prestressed concrete stained on the new Congolese market. 
While this calculation error was luckily discovered more or less in time, another miscalculation was 
only discovered when construction reached the fourth floor: “I have just calculated the reinforcement 
of a building very similar to the building of the CCC in Léopoldville, and I come to the observation that 
my columns have a much greater reinforcement than yours, even though my building only has two floors 
instead of five. [...] I noticed that to calculate the reinforcement, you forgot to take into account the 
stress rate of the steel, which in some places even reaches 2200kg/cm2 of traction.” (Coppens September 
15, 1950) This time it was deemed too costly to completely demolish the concrete structure, and 
ultimately the Brussels-based management decided only to adapt the reinforcement of the columns that 
still had to be constructed. Not even admitting the mistake to their own agents in Congo, the reason for 
the adaptation of the columns was attributed to the lower strength of the concrete beams. 
2.3.2. The failing concrete quality 
For the construction of the CCC-building, a local producer of prefabricated concrete elements, 
Dardenne, was addressed. Dardenne, like many others, was attracted to the colony by the real-estate 
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 boom. Yet his business strategy did not rely on the introduction of high-tech materials for the multi-
story buildings of the inner-city. On the contrary, he provided the most basic concrete elements. His 
hollow concrete blocks in particular, were a hit around town, especially in the African cités. Up to his 
neck in work, he was not too interested in the concrete qualities, no matter how carefully they were 
prescribed by the CCC. Tests of the concrete quality at the beginning of the construction process were 
dramatic: “WEAK!” (Richir May 22, 1950). After 15 days, test cubes – tested in the laboratory of Magnel 
in Belgium – only attained a strength of 254 kg/cm2 instead of the required 400 kg/cm2. Despite these 
disastrous results, the CCC-management decided to continue production via Dardenne. In their 
reasoning, the bad results had to be ascribed to the Africans producing the test cubes: “Errors are more 
than possible, it are the blacks who deal with these moulds.” (Richir May 22, 1950) Besides, the only 
alternative, producing the elements themselves was deemed too big an investment by Blaton-Aubert. 
Eventually, Dardenne agreed to alter his concrete composition for the CCC elements, sifting the sand 
of the Congo river like Richir urged him to. The concrete quality seemed to improve drastically; 
although the CCC lacked any serious testing infrastructure, a test beam was successfully posttensioned 
in the factory. Despite Dardenne’s efforts, the prefabrication of the elements remained difficult 
throughout the construction process. After visual inspection of the elements, as it was set out in the 
contract, the CCC refused several elements for minor faults. For Dardenne, who was obliged to replace 
these elements on his own charge, the CCC-building quickly became a financial nightmare and, in an 
attempt to save costs, he returned to his original concrete mixture. 
Inevitably, on the 14th of September, one of the concrete beam elements exploded after 
posttensioning. The dramatic blast launched concrete parts everywhere, and one of the principal streets 
of Léopoldville had to be closed off for traffic. (Fig. 3) Richir adequately described the incident as: 
“publicity-wise another much-discussed kick in the guts” (September 14, 1950). Although he was 
reluctant to do so – “We shouldn’t blame everything on him. Dardenne stays an honest man, with the 
best intentions, whose capabilities were unfortunately exceeded by our technique and its requirements.” 
(October 21, 1950) – Richir was urged by the Brussels’ management to shirk responsibility to Dardenne 




Figure 3. On site situation after the beam’s explosion: a) demolition of the end block, b) tensioning cables 
hanging loose. © Fondation Civa, Brussels 
Although the incident brought Richir’s personal relationship with Dardenne to an all-time low, on 
the upside he finally had a sound argument for the production of the concrete elements by the CCC, for 
which he had been calling since the first dramatic concrete test results. Deliberately stressing the 
sensitive point of the tainted image of prestressed concrete – “even the confidence of our own European 
agents in what they are executing is seriously staggering” (September 14, 1950) – Richir finally 
convinced Blaton-Aubert to invest in their proper concrete factory. Ironically, at the edge of bankruptcy, 
Dardenne agreed to sell his company to the CCC. Under the name Congobéton, they produced the 
remaining concrete elements. which were tested in the – still incipient – laboratory facilities of the public 
works department in Léopoldville, while awaiting their own adequate testing machinery. Besides, 
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 additional concrete test cubes were consequently flown to Belgium, to be tested at the age of 4 and 15 
days in the laboratory of professor Magnel in Belgium. 
3. Conclusion 
Although prestressed concrete was considered to be the deus-ex-machina to save Congo’s construction 
industry, its first application in the capital city turned out a disaster. Instead of economic, technical or 
social advantages, many of prestressed concrete’s traits turned out to be liabilities, showing the extent 
to which conceptual decisions were based on superficial prejudices about the Congolese construction 
industry – most often from people who never even had set foot on Congolese soil. What the many 
incidents on the building site make clear, is that the decisive factor in the success or failure of a 
construction process was not the lack of skilled labour, but rather the lack of experience with building 
in Congo or even a failing know-how about the technique of prestressed concrete, although even in 
Belgium that was precisely Blaton-Aubert’s main selling point. 
Besides, the ease with which structural errors could be covered up, indicates the extent to which the 
construction market in the former Belgian Congo was governed by quick profit and ‘wild west’ 
practices. While it is not the first aim of this paper, cases like the CCC-building show the urgency of the 
assessment of historical concrete structures in African cities such as Kinshasa, where several 
construction sites of the early 1950’s, escaped any form of control whatsoever. The CCC-building, 
miraculously still standing, functions today as the headquarters of the UN peacekeeping operations in 
the Congolese capital. While the UN is careful to lock out the city’s dangers with high walls topped with 
barbed wire, the problems within these walls could pose a more actual threat. 
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